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1. The aim of this article is to contribute to an understanding of the A∑†ådhyåy¥ on 
the basis of certain presuppositions which it may share with the Nirukta. In order to find 
out what presuppositions underlie the Nirukta, the aims and methods of that book have 
to be discovered. This in its turn requires the prior refutation of a misconception which 
has been connected with the Nirukta for more than a century, the misconception namely 
that the Nirukta, wholly or partly, deals with the history of words. As a result, most of 
this article will be concerned with the Nirukta. Apart from some short remarks in 
Section 2, the A∑†ådhyåy¥ will not come into the picture until Section 4, below. 
 
2.1. The nineteenth century say the birth of Historical Linguistics, or Comparative 
Philology. As a result, for about a hundred years linguistics "has been completely 
absorbed in diachrony" (Saussure, 1915: 82). This did not fail to influence the way 
scholars looked at the work of the native grammarians of India. 
 Påˆini's grammar does not easily lend itself to a historical interpretation. None 
the less, August Wilhelm von Schlegel opined in 1832 that the work of Påˆini, 
Kåtyåyana and Patañjali contained speculative etymologies, because it was not based on 
a knowledge of languages other than Sanskrit (Staal, 1972: 55-56). He took it for 
granted that those grammarians had been doing something closely similar to what 
linguists in his own day were doing. Von Schlegel's ideas were already exceptional in 
his own time.1 Others, e.g. Franz Bopp (1824: 118 (2)) and Wilhelm von Humboldt 
(Staal, 1972: 60) knew that the Indian grammarians did not occupy themselves with 
historical questions. 
 The temptation to look upon the Uˆådi-sËtras as dealing with the history of 
words, is far greater that in the case of the A∑†ådhyåy¥. Even Bopp (1824: 133 (17)) 
                                                
1 A recent author who criticizes Påˆini for not giving correct diachronic derivations, is Hari Mohan 
Mishra (1975-76). Liebich (1920: 33-34) is of the opinion that the forms bhrasj and masj, which we find 
in Påˆini's Dhåtupå†ha, are closer to the truth that the forms bhrajj and majj, which are used in the 
Sanskrit language, because comparison with related languages shows that these roots originally contained 
a sibilant, be it a voiced one. This opinion also is a product of what may be called the "diachronic 
fallacy". The same is true of Scharfe's (1977: 111) accusation that Påˆini "explains the reduplicated aorist 
a-pa-pt-am (from the root pat ‘fall’) ... as an a-aorist with an ad hoc invented infix /p/: a-pa[p]t-am (VII 4 
19)"; see Rocher, 1979: 171. 
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accuses the author of the Uˆådi-sËtras of making the same mistake as the European 
etymologists in deriving pronouns from verbal roots. It is clear that the author of the 
Uˆådi-sËtras could only make the same mistake as the European etymologists, if he, 
like them, sought for the histories of words. If he did not, then it is difficult to say that 
he made any mistake at all. A historical interpretation is similarly given to the Uˆådi-
sËtras by Theodore Goldstücker (1854: 236, 241-42). 
 The first edition of the Nirukta was prepared by Rudolph Roth, and appeared in 
1852. Roth does not seem to have thought that the Nirukta concerned itself with 
historical questions. After making some uncomplimentary remarks about the Indian [2] 
mind (Geist), Roth (1852: Einleitung, p. LIV) states: "der Sinn für Geschichte gieng 
ihm spurlos verloren und er beruhigte sich bei dem erlaubten unschädlichen Genusse 
der Lösung grammatischer Fragen." Apparently also Yåska had, in Roth's opinion, been 
content with "the harmless pleasure of solving grammatical problems" for which no 
historical sense was needed. Certain is that Roth (1852: Erläuterungen, p. 222) 
describes Yåska's occupation as "exegetical grammatical science". 
 Probably the first person who ascribed historical intentions to Yåska was Max 
Müller (1853). In Nir. 2.2 it is said that the derivatives of verbs may be used in one 
community, the verbs themselves in another. Examples are the noun ßava, which is used 
by the Óryas, and the verb ßavati, found among the Kambojas; further dåtra, possessed 
by the Northerners, and the corresponding verb dåti, employed by the Easterners. 
Müller (1853: 374-75) thinks that this means that the Kambojas have preserved the verb 
ßavati ("das Verbum ßavati noch lebendig erhalten haben") and that the Pråcyas 
(Easterners) no longer possess the verb dåti ("das Verbum dåti, schneiden, nicht mehr 
besitzen"). 
 This same attitude towards the Nirukta is evidenced more clearly in Müller's A 
History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature (1859). At the end of a long passage (in 
paraphrase) from the Nirukta (1.12-14), Müller (1859: 149) comments: "I doubt 
whether even at present, with all the new light which Comparative Philology has shed 
on the origin of words, questions like these could be discussed more satisfactorily than 
they were by Yåska. Like Yåska, we maintain that all nouns have their derivation, but, 
like Yåska, we must confess that this is a matter of belief rather than of proof." 
 The historical interpretation of the Nirukta has, since then, been accepted by 
almost all writers on the subject. Some examples: P. D. Gune (1918: 63-64) remarks in 
passing that some of the phonetic phenomena dealt with in Comparative Philology were 
already known to Yåska. Lakshman Sarup (1921: title-page) calls the Nirukta "the 
oldest Indian treatise on etymology, philology, and semantics". Sarup (1921: 
Introduction, pp. 65-66) does not even fight shy of giving Yåska's supposed ideas on the 
origin of language. Siddheshwar Varma (1953: XI) makes "an attempt to evaluate 
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[Yåska's] etymologies and to show that though of a primitive character, they were, on 
the whole, not unscientific". Varma (1953: 4) succeeds in his self-imposed task and sees 
Yåska "as the foremost etymologist of ancient times and certainly ... far in advance of 
his times". 
 A few authors made attempts to draw away attention from a too exclusively 
linguistic interpretation of the Nirukta. Hannes Sköld (1926: 181) noted that "when [the 
nairukta] derived a word from a verbal root, in order to explain it, we may be sure that 
the thing, or person, or animal, denoted by the word in his eyes came to share in the 
action of the verb, became, as it were, satisfied by it. For the brahman the word not only 
represented the thing, or person, or animal, it was the same thing, [3] or person, or 
animal". Sköld shows no sign, however, that he considered the historical interpretation 
of the Nirukta incorrect. 
 J. Gonda (1955: 78 (49)), writing primarily about etymologies in the Bråhmaˆas, 
makes the following observation: "Prae- and non-scientific etymology, based on the 
belief that words have some inherent connections with the objects, qualities, or 
processes denoted, does not attempt to find the historical truth about words, but to find 
the truth about objects and phenomena by means of the words." Gonda (1955: 66-68 
(37-39)) stresses the close relationship which exists between the etymologies of the 
Bråhmaˆas and those of the Nirukta. Nevertheless, Gonda (1955: 73 (44)) thinks that 
Yåska searched for the origins of words. 
 Perhaps the only person who protested against a historical interpretation of the 
Nirukta is K. Kunjunni Raja (1971: 180): "The ancient Indian approach towards 
etymology was not historical, but mainly descriptive and synchronic. The aim of 
etymology in India has not been to find out the history of the evolution of the form and 
meaning of words, but to understand their essence or their real significance through 
linguistic analysis." Unfortunately Kunjunni Raja makes no effort to produce evidence 
in support of his thesis. Moreover, in the remainder of the article (which is somewhat 
confused) Kunjunni Raja seems to fall back into the mistake which he had set out to 
expose, by speaking about "absolute" and "correct" etymologies as against "fanciful" 
and "speculative" ones. Are these metaphorical expressions? 
 
2.2. That the historical interpretation of the Nirukta could survive more than a 
century without discussion, is surprising; the more so since it fits the ancient Indian 
conditions so little. Even in Europe, before the rise of modern linguistics, development 
of language could only be pictured as decay from a pure state, which, moreover, was 
generally held to be still existing (Pedersen, 1931: 3, 7-8; Robins, 1967: 149, 153, 158, 
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166). This attitude persisted right into the 19th century2 (Pedersen, 1931: 242; Robins, 
1967: 173). Moreover, the classical grammarians of Europe had difficulties in keeping 
historical etymology and the formation of derivations and inflections apart (Robins, 
1967: 47). This confusion is still present in the writings of Horne Tooke at the end of 
the 18th, and in the writings of Wilhelm von Humboldt in the 19th century (Robins, 
1967: 156, 174). 
 If we ascribe to Yåska as much historical sense as to his pre-nineteenth century 
European colleagues (which is more than what is warranted), he may have believed that 
all languages are corruptions of one pure original language. But what else could this 
original language be but Vedic, the language of the Veda? If we accept this, it becomes 
difficult to look upon Yåska's etymologies of Vedic words as giving the histories of 
those words. And if we ascribe to Yåska no historical sense at all, the same is true. 
[4] 
 These are reflections a priori. I shall now show that a non-historical 
interpretation is in closer agreement with the text of the Nirukta. 
 
2.3. Let us suppose that Yåska was interested in the histories of words. Since the 
Nirukta contains etymologies also of Vedic words, we must then accept that Yåska 
distinguished a pre-Vedic stage of his language. What was this stage like? Yåska tells 
us that nominal words are derived from verbs (Nir. 1.12: nåmåny åkhyåtajåni; ‘nominal 
word’ (nåman) includes substantives, adjectives and pronouns, as Mehendale (1978: 6, 
fn. 4), following Whitney, points out). This provides a link between the pre-Vedic and 
the Vedic languages. But this is the only link between the two languages. The Nirukta 
contains no indication that the other three kinds of words — verbs, prepositions and 
particles; see Nir. 1.1 — can be etymologized. In other words, the pre-Vedic language 
that Yåska envisaged must be supposed to have been identical with its later stages (i.e. 
primarily Vedic) in as far as verbs, prepositions and particles are concerned. Only 
nominal words underwent changes. 
 This queer picture of the pre-Vedic language is confirmed (if we cling to the 
supposition that Yåska was interested in the history of words) when we see that in the 
Nirukta nominal words are only derived from existing verbs (Liebich, 1919: 25). 
[Varma (1953: 22) claims that Yåska manufactured "many fictitious verbs". But to 
support this claim he gives only two instances: tharv (Nir. 11.18) and puµs (Nir. 9.15). 
                                                
2 A very recent expression of this attitude is Rajavade's (1940: XXXIII) comment on Yåska's advice also 
to derive Vedic nouns from classical verbs: "This insistence on deriving Vedic words from modern roots 
is unreasonable; those who do so consider modern Sanskrit to be a perfect language and think that Vedic 
Sanskrit is irregular. But they ought to know that Vedic Sanskrit has a grammar and a vocabulary of its 
own. It would be more reasonable to say that modern Sanskrit is a development or a corruption of Vedic 
Sanskrit." 
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A third instance may not exist. It is further important to note that even these two 
unattested roots are not presented as historical reconstructions, but as existing roots.] 
 Then there is Yåska's refusal to accept semantic change. At Nir. 2.1 he 
emphasizes that in derivations the meanings are to be accounted for, the forms are of far 
less importance (na saµskåram ådriyeta/ ... yathårthaµ vibhakt¥˙ sannamayet/; see also 
Mehendale, 1978: 73-77). Yåska sticks to this principle. Where one word has several 
meanings, it gets several derivations, each derivation accounting for one of the 
meanings. Where the different meanings are not too dissimilar, the derivations may be 
the same; where they lie farther apart, the derivations differ. "(The rule is that) they 
should be explained according to their meaning: if their meanings are uniform, their 
etymologies are uniform; if their meanings are multiform, their etymologies are 
multiform." (Nir. 2.7: tåni3 cet samånakarmåˆi samånanirvacanåni/ nånåkarmåˆi cen 
nånånirvacanåni/ yathårthaµ nirvaktavyåni/; translation Sarup.) 
 Let us, in this connection, look at some derivations. Yåska derives the word 
m®tyu, here meaning "god of death", from the causal root måray "kill". Íatabalåk∑a, the 
son of Mudgala, thinks that the word is derived from m®ta+cyåvay "who throws down 
the dead person" (Nir. 11.6: m®tyur mårayat¥ti sata˙/ m®taµ cyåvayat¥ti ßatabalåk∑o 
maudgalya˙/). The question is why this word could not simply be derived [5] from the 
non-causal root m® "die". The answer is not that the etymologists of Yåska's age had a 
lack of imagination (pace Varma, 1953: 38), but that the meaning of the root m® "die" 
by itself throws no light on the function of m®tyu, the god of death. 
 A second example is the following. In Nir. 7.20 a mantra (RV 10.188.1) is cited, 
in which the words aßva and jåtavedas are in apposition. Jåtavedas, we would think, is 
here compared to a horse, is "like a horse". Since no particle of comparison (such as 
iva) has been used in the mantra, Yåska prefers to interpret the mantra differently. He 
explains aßva as samaßnuvåna "who pervades everywhere". No need to say, this sense is 
absolutely new to the word aßva. Yåska appears to be willing to go to any extent to 
avoid a semantic "change", from "horse" to "like a horse". It is true that Yåska allows, 
as a second choice, that the word aßva is used in a comparative sense (Nir. 7.20: api 
vopamårthe syåt/ aßvam iva ...). The theoretical justification for this had been given in 
Nir. 3.18, where we read that when the particles etc. expressive of comparison are 
dropped, words can be "expressive of a simile by virtue of their meaning" (arthopama): 
atha luptopamåny arthopamån¥ty åcak∑ate. 
 If we sum up the above, we come to the following results. If we accept that 
Yåska was interested in the histories of words, we must also accept that the had some 
                                                
3 Note that the word tåni refers back to sattva, the "entities" of which nominal words are expressive 
according to Nir. 1.1. Compare this with Gonda's remark quoted in subsection 2.1 above. 
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conception of the pre-Vedic stage of the Sanskrit language. This pre-Vedic language 
must have been, in Yåska's opinion, identical with the Vedic language where verbs, 
particles and prepositions are concerned. The only words that changed in the course of 
time are the nominal ones. The meanings of the nominal words, however, remained 
unaltered throughout. 
 These somewhat bizarre ideas, which we are forced to ascribe to Yåska as long 
as we give a historical interpretation to the Nirukta, constitute, in my opinion, a good 
reason to abandon that interpretation. 
 
2.4. There is one passage in the Nirukta which indicates that Yåska did not consider 
the Vedic language a precursor in time of Classical Sanskrit. In Nir. 2.2 we read that 
certain "Vedic primary nouns are derived from roots of Classical Sanskrit" 
(bhå∑ikebhyo dhåtubhyo naigamå˙ k®to bhå∑yante). Does this mean that in Yåska's 
opinion the classical language preceded the Vedic language? Evidently not, for almost 
without interruption he continues: "and also nouns of Classical Sanskrit from Vedic 
roots" (athåpi naigamebhyo bhå∑ikå˙). I consider these statements clear evidence that 
Yåska did not conceive of Vedic and Classical Sanskrit as being ordered in time. I shall, 
none the less, mention two alternative interpretations of this passage. They will be 
shown not to stand criticism. 
 The above passage might be taken to mean that nouns of the classical language 
are really derived from Vedic roots, that the Vedic nouns, on the other hand, are not [6] 
derived from classical roots, but from roots which existed in the pre-Vedic and Vedic 
languages. These roots, so it might be maintained, were somehow not used in the Vedic 
scriptures, and came again to the surface in the post-Vedic, classical language. It is clear 
that this interpretation is artificial in the extreme, and has to be discarded. 
 Secondly, one might ascribe to Yåska a primitive mentality (after the manner of 
Lévy-Bruhl), on account of which he failed to see the contradiction arising from a 
derivation of Vedic nouns from classical roots. This has to be rejected for the following 
reason. In Nir. 11.23 half a mantra (RV 10.72.4) is quoted, according to which Dak∑a is 
the son of Aditi, and Aditi the daughter of Dak∑a. Yåska does not fail to see the 
contradiction, and makes attempts to solve it. 
 The conclusion we have to draw is that Yåska considered the Vedic and the 
classical languages somehow contemporaneous. 
 
2.5. Nir. 2.1 states, in Mehendale's (1978: 73) paraphrase, that "words which, when 
derived from the verbs, can be shown to conform to the rules of accent and formation 
laid down by the grammarians and when these words also contain an obvious root 
indicating the action then these words should be so derived, i.e. they should be derived 
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from the obvious roots" (tad ye∑u pade∑u svarasaµskårau samarthau prådeßikena 
vikåreˆånvitau syåtåµ tathå tåni nirbrËyåt). We learn from Nir. 1.12 that according to 
Gårgya and some of the grammarians only such words should be etymologized (na 
sarvåˆ¥ti gårgyo vaiyåkaraˆånåµ caike tad yatra svarasaµskårau samarthau prådeßikena 
vikåreˆånvitau syåtåµ). Yåska does not accept this restriction, but emphasizes again 
that such derivations are fully acceptable (Nir. 1.14: yatho hi nu vå etat tad yatra 
svarasaµskårau samarthau prådeßikena vikåreˆånvitau syåtåµ sarvaµ prådeßikam ity 
evaµ saty anupålambha e∑a bhavati). 
 It is true that in none of the above passages Yåska uses the word "grammar" 
(vyåkaraˆa). It is none the less clear that these passages are about grammar. Moreover, 
elsewhere in the Nirukta (1.15) Yåska says: "This science is the complement of 
grammar" (tad idaµ vidyåsthånaµ vyåkaraˆasya kårtsnyam). Grammatical derivations, 
we conclude, differ from Yåska's etymologies in that they are simpler, more 
perspicacious than the latter; there is however no essential difference between the two. 
 But grammar is synchronic, not diachronic. I had occasion to point this out in 
subsection 2.1 above. A consequence of this is that the etymologies of the Nirukta are 
not diachronic either. 
 
2.6. On many occasions the Nirukta gives several etymologies of one single word in 
one single meaning. There is reason to believe that all such etymologies were [7] 
considered simultaneously correct. (This is also the opinion of J. Gonda (1955: 
72(43)).) 
 Íaunaka's B®had-Devatå (2.102-03) tells us: "The analysis of the derived forms 
(guˆa) may be [effected] by the aid of all roots (dhåtu) the characteristic of which is 
present, and the sense of which is to be expressed [by those derived forms]. A word 
(pada), of which the [radical] characteristics can be etymologized, whether it be derived 
from two roots, many roots, or one root, is one consisting of sound (ßabda) that contains 
root, preposition, members (avayava), and derived forms (guˆa)." (yåvatåm eva 
dhåtËnåµ li∫gaµ rË∂higataµ bhavet/ arthaß cåpy abhidheya˙ syåt tåvadbhir 
guˆavigraha˙// dhåtËpasargåvayavaguˆaßabdaµ dvidhåtujam/ bahvekadhåtujaµ våpi 
padaµ nirvåcyalak∑aˆam//.) Difficult as these two verses are, it seems clear that their 
author considered it possible that a word has simultaneously several etymologies. This 
certainly is how Durga understands the verses, for he quotes the first one in a passage 
where he argues that the word nighaˆ†u is derived from the three roots gam, han and h® 
simultaneously (Durga on Nir. 1.1, p. 9, l. 14-15). The three roots, Durga tells us, "come 
together in emulation and say: ‘explain this [word], which is like me, with me, explain 
it with me’". (... gamir hantir haratiß cåhaµpËrvikayå saµnipatya vadanti 
mamånurËpaµ mayaitaµ nirbrËhi mayaitaµ nirbrËh¥ti; p. 9, l. 20-21.) 
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 The Nirukta contains no explicit statement to the effect that several etymologies 
of one word in one meaning can be simultaneously correct. But the position taken by 
Íaunaka and Durga in this matter makes it reasonable to accept the same for the 
Nirukta. Yåska's procedure also seems to indicate the same thing. Consider the word 
anna "food". Yåska gives two etymologies: from å-nam and from ad (Nir. 3.9). Here it 
cannot reasonably be maintained that Yåska was in doubt whether or not this word anna 
was to be connected with the root ad. Its formation is not irregular; parallel cases are 
bhinna from the root bhid, and panna from the root pad. Moreover, the meaning of 
anna, "food", puts its connection with ad "eat" beyond doubt. It seems safe to conclude 
that the derivation of anna from å-nam is to be taken in addition to the one from ad. 
 But if indeed the different derivations of one word in one meaning were meant 
to be simultaneously valid, we must again admit that Yåska's etymologies were not 
intended as descriptions of the histories of the words concerned. This could only be 
maintained on the assumption that according to Yåska an inordinately large number of 
words is each the result of a growing together — i.e. assuming an identical form in the 
course of time — of two or more different words. This assumption deserves no serious 
attention. 
 
2.7. What we have learned in the preceding subsections can be summed up as 
follows. Yåska's etymologies were not intended to describe the history of words. [8] 
Yåska seems to have had no idea that the language which he studied was subject to 
change. Indeed, he was not aware that the classical language had developed out of the 
Vedic language. He looked upon both as timeless, perhaps we may say, eternal. 
 It seems that the Nirukta contains only one indication that its author knew that at 
least certain things in language change in the course of time. This is Nir. 9.26, where we 
read that the river Vipåß was formerly called "Uruñjirå" (pËrvam ås¥d uruñjirå). 
 
3.1. If Yåska's etymologies do not represent the histories of the words etymologized, 
what then do they do? 
 As far as I can see, there are three, and only three, situations in which one can 
rightfully say that a word is derived from another word: 1. The word evolved out of the 
other word in the course of time. 2. One has a system of grammar which produces 
words out of other words, or parts of words. 3. The speakers of the language under 
study employ (probably unconsciously) a system of grammar which produces words out 
of other words, or parts of words. (The third situation is no more than a special case of 
the second. In spite of that, only in the third and the first situation can one claim 
absolute validity for the derivations. In the second situation the case is different. To take 
an example, in Påˆini's grammar bhavati is derived from bhË, ßre∑†ha from praßasya. If 
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we take another grammar, bhavati may then be derived from gam, or from something 
different again.) 
 None of these three situations applies to Yåska. That he did not search for the 
history of words, has been shown in the preceding section. It is also clear that Yåska's 
etymologies are not derivations in a particular grammar. And to think that Yåska 
searched for the grammatical system unconsciously used by the speakers of Sanskrit, 
seems to me an importation of modern ideas into the Nirukta compared with which the 
historical interpretation is innocent. 
 This forces us to conclude that Yåska's endeavours were, from a modern point of 
view, completely and utterly mistaken. This may seem an unfair judgement to pass on a 
person who lived more than two thousand years ago. But only thus, I believe, can we 
start trying to understand Yåska on his own terms. 
 
3.2. Of the three situations which we considered in the preceding subsection, the 
third one deserves some more attention. It is true that Yåska did not search for the 
grammatical system unconsciously used by the speakers of the Sanskrit language. But 
perhaps Yåska, starting from thought associations which, he discovered, connected 
different words, came to assign an objective existence to those associations. These 
objectified thought associations were then considered to reveal the essence of the thing 
denoted, and helped gaining an insight into the true meaning of the word. 
[9] Such confusion between external and internal reality has since long been recognized 
as one of the characteristics of magic. (See e.g. Frazer, 1922: 12.) For a recent 
discussion on the relation between magic and language, see Skorupski, 1976: esp. pp. 
144-48. A similar belief in the close connection between words and things is found in 
children (Piaget, 1968: 78). 
 If we accept that Yåska's etymologies have to be looked at in this light, we find 
ourselves in close agreement with what Gonda said about the etymologies in the 
Bråhmaˆas (subsection 2.1, above). Important differences remain, however. The 
etymologies in the Bråhmaˆas may be used to gain control over persons or things, to 
further one's own interests (Gonda, 1955: 78 (49)). In the Nirukta there is no trace of 
such aims. Here this kind of magic has been developed into a method to find the 
meanings of words, a method, moreover, that is bound by a number of rules 
(Mehendale, 1978: 72-77). I shall now present evidence from the Nirukta which 
supports this interpretation. 
 
3.3. The first thing we must realize is that the Nirukta is primarily concerned with 
the meanings of words. In the case of nominal words, it provides a method to discover 
the same. This explains a number of otherwise obscure features of the Nirukta. 
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 To begin with, the Nirukta (1.1) presents itself as a commentary on the 
Nighaˆ†u, a list of words. But what commentary it is! Of the five chapters of the 
Nighaˆ†u, only the last two are explained in detail. Of the first three chapters hardly any 
words are explained. These first three chapters consist of groups of synonyms. In a 
large number of cases the Nirukta explains the word which gives the meanings of such a 
group of synonyms, but which is not, as a rule, itself one of the group. Earlier authors 
were puzzled by this. Sköld (1926: 178) suspected that the first three chapters did not 
originally form part of the Nighaˆ†u. Rajavade (1940: VI) opined that the first chapter 
of the Nirukta was not original to it. 
 The problem is easily solved as follows. The Nirukta presents a method to find 
the meaning, or the deeper significance, of words. The first three chapters of the 
Nighaˆ†u contain synonyms, words whose meanings are therefore known. Here there is, 
consequently, no need for Yåska's method.4 
 Why then does Yåska so often etymologize words which indicate the meanings 
of the groups of synonyms? These are words of everyday use, even less than the others 
in need of semantic elucidation. The answer must be that Yåska in this way wants to 
show what his method is worth. If this method is to be a trustworthy guide in finding 
the meanings of unknown words, it must be able to account for the meanings of well-
known words. The correctness of this answer is supported by the following 
circumstance. Almost every time Yåska explains a word that "really" belongs to the first 
three chapters of the Nighaˆ†u (i.e., that is not a gloss), the [10] word concerned has 
more than one meaning. Yåska therefore gives two etymologies of those words, from 
the same root when the meanings are similar, from different roots otherwise. As 
example can serve Ngh. 1.4, a group of six words, each of which means both "heaven" 
and "sun". Each of the words of this group is dealt with, and in each case the two 
meanings are accounted for (Nir. 2.13-14). Obviously such words, more than those 
which have but one meaning, are suitable to demonstrate the value of Yåska's method. 
It accounts not for just one meaning, it accounts for all the meanings that the word 
possesses. 
 That the Nirukta is primarily interested in the meanings of words, is further 
confirmed by the following. Before Yåska starts commenting on the words of the 
Nighaˆ†u, he gives a fairly long introduction (Nir. 1.1 - 2.4). In this introduction he first 
explains that there are four kinds of words: nominal words (nåman), verbs (åkhyåta), 
prepositions (upasarga) and particles (nipåta) (Nir. 1.1). Subsequently he shows that the 
meanings of verbs fall into six main categories (Nir. 1.2-3). Then the prepositions are 
                                                
4 So Sköld, 1926: 109; Roth, 1852: Erläuterungen, p. 3. Note that Sköld's book contains two apparently 
contradictory opinions regarding this matter. 
NIRUKTA AND A›ÈÓDHYÓYÁ  11 
 
 
discussed; they have various meanings, a number of which is given (Nir. 1.3). The 
meanings of the particles are divided into four categories: comparison, 
karmopasaµgraha (a not fully understood term), various meanings, no meaning (Nir. 
1.4-11; see Bronkhorst, 1979). Finally the nominal words are discussed: Nominal words 
are derived from verbs (Nir. 1.12). This statement gives rise to a few subordinate 
discussions, which establish its validity (Nir. 1.12-14), and enumerate the advantages of 
accepting its correctness (Nir. 1.15-20). The first of these advantages is that "without 
this there is no understanding of the meaning in the mantras" (... idam antareˆa 
mantre∑v arthapratyayo na vidyate; Nir. 1.15). Nir. 2.1-4 gives the rules to be observed 
while deriving nominal words from verbs. It is clear from this description that Yåska's 
introduction gives a survey of the meanings of all four kinds of words. Such an 
introduction would be completely out of place in a book dealing with the history of 
words. In a book devoted to the meanings of words, on the other hand, this introduction 
fits well. 
 A number of words from the fourth and fifth chapters of the Nighaˆ†u is not 
etymologized. The following list is based on Sköld, 1926: 183-364: aßvåjan¥ (Ngh. 
5.3.15; Nir. 9.19); asinvat¥ (Ngh. 4.3.17; Nir. 6.4); cana˙ (Ngh. 4.3.64; Nir. 6.16); 
dåvane (Ngh. 4.1.32; Nir. 4.18); bhå®j¥ka˙ (Ngh. 4.3.19; Nir. 6.4); ßitåman (Ngh. 4.1.3; 
Nir. 4.3); ßipre (Ngh. 4.1.11; 4.3.73; Nir. 6.17). In all these cases the Nirukta tells us the 
meaning of the word concerned, but gives no etymology. The case of ßitåman is 
particularly interesting, for Yåska rejects no fewer than three etymologies, because they 
do not account for what Yåska is the correct meaning, "fore-foot" (dos). The "correct" 
meaning is arrived at on the basis of the Vedic passages in which the words occur. This, 
incidentally, explains why so many Vedic mantras are quoted and explained in the 
Nirukta. They give an impression of what the meaning of the unknown word must be 
like, or the other [11] way round, they show that the meaning obtained by means of an 
etymology is acceptable. 
 One more feature of the Nirukta which shows that this book is primarily 
concerned with meanings, is its use of the preverb+root nis-vac "explain". Already 
Sköld (1926: 109) observed: "The use which the Nirukta itself makes of the compounds 
of nis+√vac shows, that the meaning of these words did not at all imply etymologizing". 
We note that the word nirukta itself is derived from the combination nis-vac. 
 All this shows 1. that the main purpose of the Nirukta is to give semantic 
elucidation of words, and 2. that the etymologies are simply part of this semantic 
elucidation; they are not supposed to bring in any other element (historical or what not). 
 
3.4. I shall now present what evidence I know of that the etymologies were thought 
to throw light on the essence of the things denoted. It consists in a number of objections 
NIRUKTA AND A›ÈÓDHYÓYÁ  12 
 
 
raised against Yåska's method, and Yåska's replies to the same. The last of these 
objections, number 7, reads: "Further, they say that an activity is preceded by the entity 
[in which it resides; hence] the derivation5 of a prior [entity] from a posterior activity is 
not tenable" (Nir. 1.13: athåpi sattvapËrvo bhåva ity åhu˙/ aparasmåd bhåvåt pËrvasya 
pradeßo nopapadyata iti/). Activity (bhåva) is what is expressed by a verb, entity 
(sattva) what is denoted by a nominal word (see Nir. 1.1). An activity is logically 
dependent upon the entity in which it resides, and follows the latter in a way. It cannot, 
therefore, be part of the essence of that entity. As far as I can see, this objection 
presupposes that etymologies reveal the essence of the things denoted by the words 
concerned. Yåska does not, in his reply, protest against this presupposition. He merely 
points out that experience teaches us that in certain cases posterior activities are 
responsible for the names of prior entities (Nir. 1.14: yatho etad aparasmåd bhåvåt 
pËrvasya pradeßo nopapadyata iti paßyåma˙ pËrvotpannånåµ sattvånåm aparasmåd 
bhåvån nåmadheyapratilambham eke∑åµ naike∑åm ...). 
 Objections 2-4 say that if indeed nominal words are derived from verbs, all 
entities which perform the same action should have the same name (objection 2; Nir. 
1.12); a thing should have as many names as there are actions with which it is 
connected (objection 3; Nir. 1.12); nominal words should have regular forms, from 
which their meanings are clearly understood (objection 4; Nir. 1.13). Yåska replies (Nir. 
1.14) that these requirements are fulfilled in certain cases, not in others. In this whole 
discussion it is taken for granted that etymologies are intended to reveal the deeper 
meaning of nominal words, to bring to light the activities connected with the things 
denoted. 
 
3.5. The procedure of the author of the Nirukta can now be characterized as [12] 
follows. In order to arrive at the meaning of an unknown word, the context in which 
that word occurs is studied to get a first idea of its meaning. Subsequently an analysis of 
the word is undertaken, in which the parts are connected with verbal roots that show 
similarity in form. The meanings of the parts must account for the meaning of the word. 
 Two presuppositions underlie this procedure: (1) The meaning of a nominal 
word is the result of a combination of the meanings of its parts. (2) The meanings of 
those parts are not assigned to them by convention, they intimately belong to them, 
more intimately even than the meanings of nominal words to those nominal words; for 
if we wish to get a deeper insight into the meaning of a nominal word, we have to turn 
to its parts, and the meanings belonging to them. 
 
                                                
5 In translating the word pradeßa I follow Scharfe (1977: 121-22). 
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4. Of6 the two presuppositions which I mentioned at the end of subsection 3.5, 
above, one (the first one) also underlies the A∑†ådhyåy¥. In another article (Bronkhorst, 
1980) I have tried to show that Påˆini's grammar starts from a semantic input, which 
gives rise to grammatical elements, which, when combined in accordance with the rules 
of grammar, in their turn produce utterances of the Sanskrit language. The utterances 
thus obtained give expression to a combination of the meanings (semantic elements) 
which started the process. 
 It is reasonable to accept that also the second presupposition underlies the 
A∑†ådhyåy¥. That the Nirukta calls itself "complement of grammar" (see subsection 2.5, 
above) makes this all the more reasonable (whether or not Yåska knew the A∑†ådhyåy¥). 
This means that the grammatical elements used in the A∑†ådhyåy¥, as well as the 
semantic elements which give rise to them, were not looked upon as mere conventions 
to facilitate the description of the Sanskrit language. On the contrary, they are the real 
elements which underlie the phenomenal manifestation of that language. 
 Seen in this light, the Nirukta and the A∑†ådhyåy¥ can be looked upon as rational 
elaborations of the same set (or closely similar sets) of presuppositions. Both assume 
that the meaning of words and larger utterances is the sum of the meanings of their 
separate parts. The author of the A∑†ådhyåy¥ set out to show in detail how these small 
units of meaning, these semantic elements, find expression in the phenomenal language. 
The author of the Nirukta, on the other hand, used his supposed knowledge in a 
different way. He developed a method with the help of which every word, however 
obscure it might seem, could be forced to yield its meaning to the investigator. He also 
tried to give strict rules that should be observed while using his method. The nature of 
his endeavour, however, brought about that these rules could not be as strict as the ones 
that govern grammatical derivations. 
 
                                                
6 In writing this section I have drawn inspiration from an unpublished article by P. Thieme, entitled 
"Påˆini". 
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